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THE NEW FEDERALISM OF THE SUPREME
COURT: DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS OF
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
James J. Lopach*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of federalism that lies at the heart of the Ameri-
can governmental system has neither an inherent nor a consistent
justification. Its beginning was in politics and not principle, the re-
sult of a compromise struck in 1787 between centralists and con-
federationists. Agreement as to the meaning of federalism runs
only to the observation that there are two levels of government
available for solving the nation's and states' problems. Disagree-
ment abounds over which level of government should act or prevail
in a given set of circumstances. Both the United States Supreme
Court and Congress have repeatedly altered the shape of federal-
ism, sometimes strengthening the national government and some-
times favoring the states. In recent years the Supreme Court has
recognized a narrow range of exceptions to Congress' broad regula-
tory power under the commerce clause and created a new category
of federalism cases. The judiciary's brand of "new federalism" has
paralleled a decade of congressional concern for decentralizing gov-
ernmental power and strengthening the states.
In 1976 in National League of Cities v. Usery,1 the United
States Supreme Court began this new chapter in the law of Ameri-
can federalism. A majority of five justices ruled that in some in-
stances the powers reserved to the states under the tenth amend-
ment limit the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce
clause. The opinion by Justice Rehnquist emphasized the "essen-
tial role of the States in our federal system of government ' 2 and
uncovered a critical element of state sovereignty that must be kept
free from federal control. A few days later in a dissenting opinion
in another case, Chief Justice Burger repeated these sentiments for
a realigned federalism:
Only last week in National League of Cities v. Usery . .. [w]e
took steps to arrest the downgrading of States to a role compara-
ble to the departments of France, governed entirely out of the
national capital. Constant inroads on the powers of the States to
* Associate Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department, University of
Montana; Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1973.
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. Id. at 844.
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manage their own affairs cannot fail to complicate our system and
centralize more power in Washington."
The National League of Cities decision caused considerable specu-
lation concerning how far the Court was prepared to go in revital-
izing the states' governmental role.
The Supreme Court's new federalism is of keen interest to en-
ergy producing states, including Montana, that derive a significant
proportion of their revenue from various kinds of severance taxes.
The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
4
held that Congress was the proper battleground to resolve the con-
troversy over the level of state severance taxes. A congressional at-
tack on state severance taxes on coal did occur at the same time
that Commonwealth Edison was running its course.5 If Congress
does act to limit the taxing power of Montana and other states,
Montana undoubtedly would go to court again but this time with a
defense based on National League of Cities. This article scruti-
nizes the shadow cast by National League of Cities and suggests
that its limited reach probably does not cover federal restriction of
routine state taxation and regulation.
II. THE DECISION
A. The Two-Step Reasoning Process
National League of Cities involved a declaration that Con-
gress' 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act were un-
constitutional. The Court said that the commerce clause could not
be used to extend minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to
employees of state and local governments. The sovereignty of the
states protected by the tenth amendment included freedom to
manage employer-employee relationships when traditionally gov-
ernmental services were affected. A two-step reasoning process was
used by the Court to come to this judgment.
The first step in the Court's analysis in National League of
3. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) (at time of publication, U.S. cite available at 453 U.S. 609
(1981)).
5. In 1979 bills were introduced in both houses, H.R. 6825, H.R. 6654, H.R. 7163, S.
1778, S. 2695, 96th Cong. (1979), and two years later the 97th Congress took up similar
measures, H.R. 1313, S. 178, 97th Cong. (1981). Two types of approaches were used in these
bills: (1) a 12.5 percent limit on state severance taxes on all energy resources extracted from
Indian or federally owned land, and (2) an identical ceiling for levies on all coal destined for
interstate commerce to be used for producing electricity. The principal backers of the bills
represented the midwestern states that supported the suit in Commonwealth Edison. In late
1981 there was a retreat by opponents of the coal producing states, but a renewed effort in
1982 was predicted by the Montana governor and the Montana Congressional delegation.
[Vol. 43
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Cities was a determination that the federal government signifi-
cantly affected the state's ability to act in its sovereign capacity. In
the Court's language, this was "Congressional authority directed
not to private citizens, but to the States as States."6 The concern
of the Court, therefore, was not congressional regulation of private
enterprise which, in a federal system, may also be subject to the
regulation of state government. "States qua States," to the Court,
meant "functions essential to separate and independent exis-
tence."1 In National League of Cities the Court decided that the
state's discretion to determine the shape of employer-employee re-
lationships-wages paid, hours worked, overtime rate-was such a
function. Speaking in more general terms, the Court said that for
Congress "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure in-
tegral operations"8  constituted an invasion of the state's
sovereignty.
The Court's judgment of unconstitutionality did not rest
solely on the finding that Congress had acted to "significantly alter
or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee re-
lationships." A second determination was necessary, namely that
the federal limitation on the state's discretion "to structure inte-
gral operations" frustrated the state's responsibilities of "tradi-
tional governmental functions."10 The Court took several stabs at
explaining what it meant by these kinds of services. Specific exam-
ples were given: "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, pub-
lic health, and parks and recreation." 1 These functions also were
defined in terms of the origin of local governments: "[I]t is func-
tions such as these which governments are created to provide, ser-
vices such as these which the States have traditionally afforded
their citizens."1 ' Finally, these functions were explained in terms
of the basic purpose of local government: "These activities are typ-
ical of those performed by state and local governments in discharg-
ing their dual functions of administering the public law and fur-
nishing public services."18
6. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
7. Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) and Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
8. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
9. Id. at 851.
10. Id. at 852.
11. Id. at 851.
12. Id.
13. Id.
1982]
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B. Commentary on the Decision
The Court's guidance as to what is an "integral operation" of a
sovereign entity and what is a "traditional" governmental service
was not sufficient to prevent uncertainty or unrealistic interpreta-
tion of the decision. For some commentators, National League of
Cities would be the principal rationale of the Burger Court's "solid
states' rights stance" '14 or even justification for "extravagant claims
of state sovereignty."15 For example, one interpretation speculated
that the rule of the case could serve "to shield state energy regula-
tion from federal preemption."' 16 If National League of Cities de-
parted from the "settled jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause,' ' 7
then the possibility existed that federal activity concerning utility
rates, mining reclamation, and natural gas production would be
unconstitutional.
The majority opinion in National League of Cities, however,
clearly anticipated that the federal government would continue to
have a role to play when a strong national interest is present, even
though this activity involves "intrusion upon the protected area of
state sovereignty."' 8 Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion
gave special emphasis to this. point:
[I]t seems to me that [the Court] adopts a balancing approach,
and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and
where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards
would be essential.'
Thus, to interpret National League of Cities as the death knell of
federal regulation was unwarranted.
Another view was that of a leading constitutional commenta-
tor who held out the possibility that the decision contained the
groundwork for judicial recognition of "individual rights to decent
levels of basic governmental services."20 This interpretation pre-
ferred to attach the Court's use of the word "essential" to the
"traditional governmental services" in the second step of analysis
14. Smith, Independent Interpretation: California's Declaration of Rights or Decla-
ration of Independence, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 199, 231 n.141 (1981).
15. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirma-
tive Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1104 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tribe].
16. Catalano, Balancing Federal Energy Regulation and State Sovereignty: The
Emerging Controversy, 107 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 53 (1981).
17. Id. at 56.
18. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
19. Id. at 855.
20. Tribe, supra note 15, at 1102.
184 [Vol. 43
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rather than to the delineation of "sovereignty" in the first step.
Ironically, the Burger Court was viewed as calling for judicial carv-
ing out of new "essential" substantive rights rather than deferring
to local governmental processes for deciding what rights were es-
sential. Numerous commentators on National League of Cities
made the consistent point that the case lacked a precise standard.
Rulings of the federal judiciary at the appellate court and Supreme
Court levels had the potential of providing the missing precision.
C. Circuit Court Interpretation and the Balancing Test
Since 1976 the United States Courts of Appeals have ruled in
a large number and variety of cases in which National League of
Cities figured in the parties' arguments and the courts' reasoning.
The controversies involved varying degrees of interference in local
activities by the federal government,21 but the reasoning of the ap-
peals courts was not consistent and occasionally departed from the
approach of National League of Cities. In some cases the language
of the Supreme Court was twisted so that the two critical perspec-
tives of "integral" operations of a sovereign state and "traditional"
governmental services became intertwined. For example, operation
of an airport was found to be "within the category of traditional-
integral government functions.""
Several cases used the balancing approach suggested by Jus-
tice Blackmun in his National League of Cities concurring opin-
ion. In determining that New York City was required to enforce a
local transportation plan pursuant to the national Clean Air Act,'
the Second Circuit felt compelled "to balance the reason for the
exercise against the extent of usurpation of state policymaking or
invasion of integral state functions that would result. 2 4 The Fifth
21. For example, the controversies have involved the Clean Air Act, Equal Pay Act,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Fair Labor
Standards Act, Veterans Reemployment Rights Act, Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Acts, criminal statutes defining mail fraud, racketeering, and tax evasion, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Local activities that allegedly
were either an "integral" aspect of sovereignty or a "traditional" governmental service in-
cluded the following: regulation of traffic for pollution control, providing telephone service,
defining criminal actions, paying unemployment compensation, licensing drivers, powers of
escheat, running a postal service, operating a cement plant, regulating natural gas, and run-
ning an oil and gas business. The appeals courts concluded that unemployment compensa-
tion, driver licensing and airport operation were protected from federal intrusion by the
states' mantle of sovereignty.
22. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1979).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857f (1976).
24. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
1982]
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Circuit used the balancing approach in upholding the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission's abandonment jurisdiction concern-
ing a state-owned gas operation of Texas:
[W]e have determined that the important federal interest in se-
curing a continuous supply of natural gas in interstate markets
outweighs the incidental effect that Commerce regulation might
have on the school children of Texas.25
That court also used a balancing test to determine that congres-
sional interest in securing reemployment for veterans outweighed
Florida's right to decide how to provide its essential services."
Other strands of reasoning used by the appeals courts in resolving
federal-state conflicts included a governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion for local activities,2 7 an evolutionary interpretation of the
words traditional and integral in order "to meet the changing
times,"28 a distinction between federal "coercion" of states and op-
tional federal grants-in-aid "with strings attached,"2 9 and a dis-
tinction based on the constitutional grounds of the federal action
(war powers80 and the fourteenth amendment"1 more easily over-
coming a tenth amendment challenge than the commerce clause).
The decisions of the appeals courts did not have a direct bear-
ing on the question of a congressional restriction of state severance
taxes. There was language in the opinions, however, that might be
useful in predicting a judicial determination in the future concern-
ing a coal tax ceiling. The critical issue would be, of course,
whether congressional action under the commerce clause could in-
terfere with the states' power of taxation. An opinion of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an exercise of Congress' war
powers could outweigh the interests of a state as an employer, but
it also speculated that "[elven nonemergency exercises of the com-
inerce power, the source of the amendments invalidated in Na-
tional League of Cities, outweigh state interests in certain circum-
stances. 3 2 This court indicated that congressional action was
beyond challenge when it protected national interests or dealt with
major national problems. In another Fifth Circuit case, the na-
tional energy situation was judged to be a sufficiently serious na-
25. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
27. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1977).
28. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
29. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
30. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
31. Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976).
32. Peel. 600 F.2d at 1084.
[Vol. 43
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 43 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/3
THE NEW FEDERALISM
tional concern to outweigh Texas' unilateral control of its natural
gas business whose income was dedicated to public education."
From the severance tax perspective, the pertinent inquiry
would be whether a congressionally enacted coal tax ceiling, based
on the commerce clause and arguably for the purpose of enhancing
national energy independence, would withstand a challenge based
on the states' tenth amendment power to tax. The power to tax is
undoubtedly of the very essence of governmental sovereignty, un-
like many other more mundane state functions. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clearly made the point
that taxation is an integral operation of the state:
Appellants have asserted that the postal power is analogous to
the taxing power, which is exercised simultaneously by both the
federal government and the individual states. This analogy is pa-
tently false. The Constitution provides for a system of dual sover-
eignties; the power to tax is necessary to the survival of the fed-
eral government and of the states. History demonstrates that the
states can survive without running postal services."
Could Congress then limit the states' power to levy severance
taxes? Another Second Circuit case suggests that possibly it could.
Against a challenge based on National League of Cities, this court
held that Congress had power under the commerce clause to pre-
clude "imposition of New York estate taxes upon veterans' estates
which escheat to the United States. 3 5 National League of Cities
was distinguished on the grounds that it involved federal interfer-
ence with "integral governmental functions," while the New York
case did not deal with "day-to-day affairs of the states."3 " The crit-
ical question concerning mineral severance taxes would be whether
they were sufficiently integral to state sovereignty.
Two 1981 cases, one in the Ninth Circuit 7 and one in the
Tenth Circuit,3 8 involved state taxation and state revenue sources,
but neither case forecloses speculation about the constitutional
fate of a coal tax ceiling. In the Ninth Circuit case the appeals
court rejected a tenth amendment challenge to the Railroad Revi-
talization and Regulatory Reform Act. 9 That measure prohibited a
state from taxing railroad property at a higher rate than other bus-
33. Public Serv. Co., 587 F.2d at 716.
34. United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. New York v. United States, 574 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 131 n.6.
37. Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Oklahoma v. FERC, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981).
39. 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (Supp. III 1979).
1982]
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iness property. The court's reasoning struck a balance in favor of
the national interest in a renewed railroad industry and said that
taxation of "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" was not an
integral state power.' 0 The Tenth Circuit also used a balancing test
to uphold the Natural Gas Policy Act of 19781 against a National
League of Cities argument, but the court's critical point was that
regulating the price of natural gas was not a "traditional state
function.'4 Although the case did not directly involve state taxes,
a low federally imposed price would reduce state revenue under an
existing percent of value tax. The court, in commenting on this
possibility, could have been prophesying a later court's pronounce-
ment on a congressionally imposed coal tax cap:
If the financial impact on the functioning of the governmental
bodies involved were so severe as to impair the state's ability to
function effectively in a federal system, as in National League of
Cities, then it could be said that the impact and intrusion
threaten the state's separate and independent existence. Such is
not the case here. Federal regulation which has an indirect effect
on state treasuries is not the same impermissible intrusion on
state sovereignty found in National League of Cities."
These two recent cases, consequently, echo the previous National
League of Cities construction of the circuit courts. Congress in
pursuit of a national interest, it seems, can limit a state tax as long
as that tax is not truly inherent to state sovereignty and a princi-
pal contributor to the state treasury.
D. Supreme Court Interpretation
In 20 cases since National League of Cities, the United States
Supreme Court has heard arguments calling for the application,
extension, or restriction of the new doctrine of federalism. The Su-
preme Court's decisions in these cases reflected the cautiousness of
the courts of appeals in that the National League of Cities rule
was normally given the narrowest interpretation. A review of the
holdings and observations of these decisions will help to predict
the probable fate of a tenth amendment challenge to a congressio-
nally imposed coal tax ceiling.
The cases which comprise the progeny of National League of
Cities make it clear that the 1976 majority of Rehnquist, Burger,
40. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. 656 F.2d at 408.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1976).
42. Oklahoma v. FERC, 661 F.2d at 836.
43. Id.
[Vol. 43
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Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell had in mind a major reform of
American federalism. In a dissenting opinion in Nevada v. Hall,"
Justice Rehnquist, the majority's draftsman in National League of
Cities, wrote that the Court must recognize the "doctrinal evolu-
tion of concepts of state sovereignty." 8 The clear message was that
the Court would further a trend toward strengthened state govern-
ment. Justice Powell, in another case, used his concurring opinion
to link the National League of Cities philosophy to the following
states-rights remarks of Justice Hugo Black: "[T]he National Gov-
ernment will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. "46
The progeny of National League of Cities suggest how far the
proponents of the new theory were willing to go. In a dissent in a
1976 case, for example, Chief Justice Burger argued for a halt in
the "downgrading of States" in the realm of state sovereignty by
including the right to use a political patronage system. 7 A year
later Burger used National League of Cities in another dissent to
argue that the federal government could not require a state to pay
for law libraries in prisons.48 Justice Powell supported Burger's po-
sition in a concurring opinion in a subsequent case. Citing Na-
tional League of Cities, Powell wrote that a federal court order
requiring a state to appropriate funds ordinarily "would raise the
gravest constitutional issues. ' 49 In that case the order was sus-
tained because its purpose was to remedy unconstitutional segrega-
tion by the state itself. Additional examples of the possible extent
of the National League of Cities philosophy are found in other
dissenting opinions. Justice Stewart agrued that the tenth amend-
ment precludes application of federal antitrust law to municipali-
ties to preserve their "wide latitude . . . in the manner in which
they will structure delivery of those governmental services which
their citizens require."' 0 Justice Powell would have voided the At-
torney General's preclearance of changes in local election practices
under the 1965 Voting Rights Act:
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic soci-
ety of preserving local control of local matters .... Preservation
44. 440 U.S. 410, 434 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 434.
46. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579 (1979) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44 (1971)).
47. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
48. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. Milliken v. Bradley, 443 U.S. 267, 295 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 (1978)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
19821
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of local control, naturally enough, involves protecting the integ-
rity of state and local governments. See National League of Cit-
ies .... "
The continuing appearance of National League of Cities in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, therefore, was principally in minor-
ity opinions. In only one case5 2 since 1976 did a majority rely on
National League of Cities as grounds for its decision. Here, Justice
Powell found the majority's interpretation of National League of
Cities so strained that he left their company and joined Justices
Brennan, White and Stevens in dissent. The majority ignored the
critical proprietary-governmental distinction when it ruled that the
commerce clause did not prohibit South Dakota from preferring its
residents in selling state-owned cement. Justice Blackmun, for the
majority, wrote:
Considerations of sovereignty independently dictate that market-
place actions involving "integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions"-such as the employment of certain
state workers-may not be subject even to congressional regula-
tion pursuant to the commerce power.sa
Justice Powell's dissent rejected this extreme version of state sov-
ereignty and relied on traditional commerce clause doctrine, of
which National League of Cities was a part:
The application of the Commerce Clause to this case should turn
on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a public
enterprise undertakes an "integral operatio[n] in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions," the Commerce Clause is not di-
rectly relevant. If however, the State enters the private market
and operates a commercial enterprise for the advantage of its pri-
vate citizens, it may not evade the constitutional policy against
economic Balkanization."
National League of Cities has not had a dynamic career
before the Supreme Court. Four Justices, Burger, Rehnquist, Stew-
art, and Blackmun, have attempted to use the case to alter long-
standing governmental relations, but no basic changes have materi-
alized. Justice Brennan, a dissent writer in National League of
Cities, has periodically called attention to the progress and scope
of the proposed revolution. In 1976 he expressed concern about the
majority's increasing willingness to defer to state action: "The
51. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201-02 n.12 (1980).
52. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
53. Id. at 438 n.10.
54. Id. at 449-50 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43
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Court continues its reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause and
its repudiation of established principles guiding judicial analysis
thereunder . . . . "5 In 1977, in a non-commerce clause case,56 Jus-
tice Brennan questioned whether the advocates of the new philoso-
phy knew where they were headed. To Brennan, National League
of Cities had meant that the "States' authority to tax, spend
money, and generally make financial decisions is among the most
important of their governmental powers. '5 7 In this non-commerce
clause case the majority held that taxing and spending powers
were outside the rule that "the Contract Clause does not require a
State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute
of its sovereignty. 5 8 Brennan's response was one of puzzlement:
"One may rightfully feel unease that the Court is in the process of
developing a concept of state sovereignty that is marked neither by
consistency nor intuitive appeal." 59
The best assessment of the failure of National League of Cit-
ies as a precedent lies in the many cases where a Supreme Court
majority rejected claims so based. The Court set aside tenth
amendment challenges to the following federal actions: the Clean
Air Act's requirement of a local transportation plan,60 the Sherman
Antitrust Act's application to municipalities," the federal registra-
tion tax on civil aircraft,6" a section 1983 suit under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 against local governing bodies, 63 an anti-dis-
crimination remedy based on the enforcement provision of the
fourteenth amendment,6" the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on li-
ability for nuclear accidents, 65 congressional regulation of foreign
commerce under the commerce clause," the federal judiciary's re-
fusal to create an evidentiary privilege for state legislators,6' the
1965 Voting Rights Act's regulation of local elections,6 8 and imple-
mentation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
55. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 817 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
56. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
57. Id. at 51 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id.
60. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310 (1977).
61. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
62. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
63. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Sciences, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
64. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
65. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
66. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
67. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
68. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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1977."9 What is significant about the five-year history of National
League of Cities is that the Supreme Court has not once extended
its rule to federal activity that affects state and local governments
beyond the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The United States Supreme Court has made fewer rulings
than the federal courts of appeals that implicate National League
of Cities and would be relevant to a state challenge to a federally
imposed restriction on severance taxes. The one case that warrants
consideration from this perspective, Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association, makes the same point as
the pertinent cases of the appeals courts discussed above. The
message is that in its ultimate decision the Supreme Court will use
a balancing test, and not the National League of Cities step-by-
step analysis, in determining whether a congressional solution to a
national problem inordinately interferes with a state's sovereignty.
The Hodel case was a 9-0 decision in which Justice Marshall
wrote the Court's opinion and Justice Rehnquist wrote a concur-
ring opinion. A federal district court had determined that the 1977
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 71 was an invasion of
the states' sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment. This
holding, the Supreme Court said, rested on "an unwarranted ex-
tension of the decision in National League of Cities."' The impor-
tance of the Hodel case is its strict interpretation of the National
League of Cities rule and its formulation of the proper test for
applying that rule.
The Court in narrowly construing National League of Cities
emphasized that its tenth amendment prohibition applied to "fed-
eral regulation directed not to private citizens, but to the States as
States. 17 The 1977 Reclamation Act was directed at the affairs of
private businesses which were subject to the regulatory jurisdiction
of both the national and state governments. Congress, the Court
said, at any time could "displace or pre-empt state laws regulating
private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws con-
flict with federal law."'7 4
The Court fashioned a three-part test out of the National
League of Cities opinion to be used to determine if a congressional
commerce power enactment violated the tenth amendment. All
69. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
70. Id.
71. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1 1977).
72. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
73. Id. at 286.
74. Id. at 290.
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three of the following requirements had to be satisfied to permit
invalidation of a federal action:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regu-
lates the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must
address matters that are indisputable "attributes of state sover-
eignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions."' 5
The Act challenged in Hodel ran afoul of the first requirement.
The Court indicated, however, that measuring up to the three
requirements would not guarantee that a tenth amendment chal-
lenge would prevail. Even though all three analytical steps repeat
an emphasis on state sovereignty-"States as States," "attributes
of state sovereignty," and "integral operations"-a balancing test
(in fact, a fourth and superseding requirement) could favor the na-
tional activity: "There are situations in which the nature of the
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies State sub-
mission. "76 In support of this position the Court cited Fry v.
United States"7 and the majority opinion and Blackmun's concur-
ring opinion in National League of Cities.8
E. Congressional Limitation of a State's Powers of Taxation
There is little doubt that Montana and other states would rely
on the National League of Cities and Hodel cases in challenging
the constitutionality of a congressional limitation on their power of
taxation. Several amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the appellees
argued in Commonwealth Edison that National League of Cities
stood in the way of the federal judiciary's utilization of the com-
merce clause to void the Montana coal tax. When the National
League of Cities approach, as recently used and refined in Hodel,
is reduced to its essential elements, there are three inquiries that
must be made: (1) has the federal government interfered with the
state in its sovereign capacity; (2) has this intrusion limited the
state's ability to perform traditional governmental services; and (3)
has this impairment been justified by a compelling national need?
It is difficult to imagine that a congressionally imposed sever-
ance tax ceiling would not be judged as an invasion of state sover-
75. Id. at 287-88.
76. Id. at 288 n.29.
77. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
78. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53; id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
1982]
13
Lopach: The New Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1982
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
eignty. Appellees' brief in Commonwealth Edison used Gibbons v.
Ogden"0 to argue that the state taxation was critical for the states
to have a meaningful role in the federal system: "As this Court has
always recognized, the states' 'power of taxation is indispensable to
their existence.' ,s The amicus curiae brief of the State of Wyo-
ming in Commonwealth Edison made a similar point. The argu-
ment was that either judicial action or a congressional enactment
based on the commerce clause that upset a responsible exercise of
the states' taxing and spending powers would threaten the states'
"separate and independent existence."81 The brief of the Western
Conference of the Council of State Governments said that "no
other challenge could be so disruptive of the states' sovereign au-
thority" as federal interference with its taxing and spending
powers."2
Secondly, it would not be a difficult task for a state to link its
severance tax to the provision of basic and traditional services that
residents need and demand. The State of Montana through its
elected officials, for example, relied on first-hand experience with
earlier mining boom and bust to decide what to do in the case of
coal. Thus Montana itself, and not the federal government, took
steps to provide for the known and unknown needs associated with
mining development. The State of Wyoming, in its brief in Com-
monwealth Edison, speaking from the insight of that state's some-
time sorry experience, said:
This case involves governmental functions and services as dis-
cussed in the Usery case. The Appellants' restrictive view of gov-
ernmental functions and services does not reduce the impact of
rapid coal development in a sparsely populated area. Typically,
the existing ranching or farming community lacks the infrastruc-
ture or resources to accomodate rapid industrial growth. Some
towns will be created overnight. Millions of dollars must be ex-
pended for necessary capital facilities, including: sewage treat-
ment, water treatment and distribution, solid waste, mental and
physical health care, recreation and library, transportation, and
educational facilities. In addition, the traditional police, fire and
sanitation services must be provided. 3
79. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
80. Brief for Appellees at 44, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946
(1981).
81. Brief for Wyominng, et al. at 11, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.
Ct. 2946 (1981).
82. Brief for Western Conference of the Council of State Governments at 29, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
83. Brief for Wyoming, et al. at 12, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct.
2946 (1981).
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Wyoming went on to argue that a state government's duty to pro-
vide for the public good includes "decisions now to meet future
expectations of basic governmental services.""M The basic point was
that current and future governmental services tied to coal develop-
ment must be paid for out of the state treasury. Therefore, accord-
ing to Wyoming's standards, Montana's creation of a trust fund to
meet governmental costs when its wealth of coal is gone was both
prudent and legitimate.
The first two inquiries that would be made when applying Na-
tional League of Cities to a congressional limit on a state sever-
ance tax could easily be resolved in favor of the states. The third
inquiry, whether congressional action had been based upon a seri-
ous national need, undoubtedly would lend itself to judicial subjec-
tivity and thus indeterminateness. As a result, a future Court, es-
pecially after giving Congress a green light in this matter in
Commonwealth Edison, would have good reason to defer to the
wisdom of its elected cousins. Given a congressional finding of
grave national concern, the Court's check most likely would be pre-
cipitated only by absolute or permanent impairment of the taxing
power. The Court's resort to a balancing test in ultimo leads to the
suggestion of the judiciary's ineptness to determine the shape of
American federalism.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed a recent attempt by the United
States Supreme Court to strengthen the role of the states in our
federal scheme of government. The Court's new federalism was an-
nounced by a five-justice majority in 1976, but since that time
propagation of this new federalism has been confined almost exclu-
sively to dissenting opinions. The failure of the National League of
Cities rationale to catch hold is probably due to the fact that it
represents only one of two dominating themes of the contemporary
Court. Supreme Court majorities have repeatedly demonstrated re-
spect for the health and competence of local government, but they
also have made it clear that the vehicle of this localism should be
deference and not activism. National League of Cities was the pro-
nouncement of an activist Court, marking the first time in 40 years
that the Supreme Court had voided a congressional measure based
on the commerce clause. The Commonwealth Edison decision, on
the other hand, combined regard for local processes and recogni-
tion of the Court's institutional limitations. The Court refused to
84. Id. at 14.
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develop new law that would have positioned it, rather than Con-
gress, as the watchdog of state taxes in the federal system. An ac-
tivist posture in realigning state and federal taxation policy simply
had no appeal for the Court. The National League of Cities prog-
eny have the same theme as Commonwealth Edison: if there is to
be a new federalism, it should be the creation of the political
branches and not the judiciary. For Montana this might mean a
Court unreceptive to arguments of state sovereignty over taxation
and environmental issues. For the national scheme of government,
however, this directive means that the legislature rather than the
judiciary should chart the contours of federalism. Such a pro-
nouncement appears to have dampened the effect of National
League of Cities.
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